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LIST OF PARTIES
This appeal arrises out of a criminal proceeding in
the Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley Department, before
the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley.

The original parties were

West Valley City as plaintiff, and Frank Ronald Borrego as
defendant.

Mr. Borrego is appealing a finding of contempt

by Judge Medley and the Fifth Circuit Court has responded
to the appeal by Mr. Borrego.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§77-35-26 (1953), granting jurisdiction to this Court
to hear and decide appeals from Circuit Courts which
affect the substantial rights of a defendant.

Appellant

is appealing a finding of contempt by the Fifth Circuit
Court, West Valley City Department, during sentencing in a
criminal action.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did appellant's conduct during the sentencing

procedure fall within the protection of his constitutional
right to free speech and right to counsel, which would
nullify a finding of contempt?
2.

Does the Court have a duty to warn a person that

his conduct is not acceptable and if continued, will
result in a finding of contempt?
3.

Is there sufficient evidence in the record that

appellant in fact interrupted the due course of the
proceedings of the Court?
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
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government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. Const. Amend 1.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. Amend VI.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel tho attendance of witness in
his cwn beahlf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged tohave teen
committed, and the reight to appeal in all cases.
Const, of Ut. Sec. 12.
Mo law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press....Const,
of Ut. Sec. 15.
The following acts or omissions in respect
to a court or proceedings therein are contempts
of the authority of the Court: (1)
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior
towards the judge while holding the court,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial
or other judicial proceeding. Utah Code
Ann., §78-32-1(1) (1953) .
...At the time of sentencing, the court
shall hear any testimony or information the
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires
to present concerning the appropriate sentence.
This testimony or information shall be
presented in open court on record and in the
presence of the defendant. Utah Code Ann.,
§77-18-1(4) (1953).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant (Mr. Borrego) was found guilty of
possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct,
terroristic threats and public intoxication on June 19f
1987.

Mr. Borrego represented himself at the trial and

after having been found guilty, requested that the Court
provide him with an attorney before sentencing.
Mr. Borrego appeared with court-appointed counsel for
sentencing on July 16, 1987. During the course of the
sentencing proceedings, Mr. Borrego had several discussions
with his attorney on the record, as well as one
conversation off the record.

The Court, after pronouncing

sentence on the original charges, indicated that he found
Mr. Borrego to be in contempt of court for having used
profanity in his courtroom, which tended to interrupt the
orderly proceedings of the sentencing hearing.

Judge

Medley consequently sentenced Mr. Borrego to serve 30 days
in the county jail for his contempt.
Pursuant to the instructions of the Court, Mr.
Borrego, who was in custody at the time due to a
commitment he was serving from another Court, was placed
sitting down in the jury box, still in handcuffs and
shackles.

A microphone was placed directly in front of
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him. (Transcript page 11, hereafter abbreviated as T.)
Counsel then addressed the Court at the podium in the
middle of the courtroom.

During the sentencing

proceeding, Mr. Borrego1s court-appointed counsel made a
motion for a new trial and presented argument thereon.
The Court, after considering the motion, denied the motion
and counsel made the statement to the Court that he was
not aware of any legal reason why sentencing should not
proceed.

At that time, Mr. Borrego, who was seated across

the room from his attorney, spoke up with the statement,
j

'Pardon me." (T at 6).

The Court then indicated, "Just a

second, Mr. Borrego." id.

After a brief discussion

between the Court and counsel, the Court stated the
following:
The Court:

I'll allow you to conference
with Mr. Borrego, since he has
his hand raised. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. Kunz:

Thank you.

Mr. Borrego:

How about lack of due process?

Mr. Kunz:

Shhh, Okay.

Mr. Borrego:

Goddamit, I was kept in a goddam
holding cell four-and-a-half hours
while people went to lunch and came
back, and he went to lunch and came
back, and goddamit, I didn't have
lunch.
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Mr. Kunz:

Shhh.

(Conference off the record between counsel
and his client)
Mr. Borrego:

Goddamit. I want this goddam
judge dismissed for prejudice.
(T at 6 and 7).

Mr. Borrego1s counsel then made further argument to
the Court on his motion for a new trial, and there
occurred further dialogue between counsel and the Court
pertaining to the arguments raised. (T at 7f 8 and 9 ) .
The argument asserted by counsel on behalf of Mr. Borrego
was that Mr. Borrego was denied due process in that he
was held in a holding cell from approximately 9:00 A.M.
until his trial began at 1:30 in the afternoon, and Mr.
Borrego was not allowed to eat lunch or have any sort of
snack.

Counsel argued that other people visiting the

Court had such freedom and the Court responded as
follows:
The Court:

Do you know why you probably have
that freedom, Mr. Kunz? And let me
state this as well. As you noticed
within your conversation with Mr.
Borrego, he used profanity which I
find extremely offensive—

Mr. Borrego:

I find your court profane.

The Court:

And as you see, he is acting in the
manner that he's currently acting
in, is in essence the same way on
which he was acting on that particular
day.
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Mr. Borrego:

It's not an act.

The Court:

When a defendant acts in that
particular manner, of course, in
order to continue with the Court's
business in an orderly manner, we
take them out of the Courtroom. Now,
I am confident that that was one of the
reasons why Mr. Borrego was held in
the holding cell versus sitting in
the jury box, as he is right now.
(T at 7) .

Further dialogue continued, wherein Mr. Borrego made
various statements, with the permission of his counsel
and with the permission of the Court.

The Court even

indicated at one point that the proceedings which were
taking place where Mr. Borrego was being allowed an
opportunity to speak with the Court on the record, was
proper unless there was some valid reason for the
proceedings not to be recorded. (T at 11)

After the

Court pronounced that it was proper for conversation to
be on the record, Mr. Borrego was allowed to speak 28
times, without interruption by the Court, and without any
indication at all from the Court that he was not allowed
to speak, except for one point where the Court asked Mr.
Borrego not to interrupt him, and Mr. Borrego obliged the
Court without any interruption.

(T at 13)

Following the pronouncement of sentence on the four
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charges to which Mr. Borrego had previously been found
guilty of, the Court stated the following:
The Court:

I personally feel as if I have been
rather patient with Mr, Borrego.
Based on his outbursts in which, on
a number of times here in this
courtroom this morning, he used profanity,
I think Mr. Borrego is keenly aware that
this is improper conduct in this particular
Court... I am satisfied that his conduct is
designed to prevent and interfere with
the orderly process of this particular
Court. (T at 17) .

The Court subsequently found Mr. Borrego in contempt
of court and sentenced him to spend 30 days in the Salt
Lake County Jail, which 30 days was to run consecutive to
the time that Mr. Borrego was spending on a commitment
from another Court.

The 30 days jail sentence is the

maximum allowed by statute for contempt. Utah Code Ann.,
§78-32-1(1) (1953).
Although the Court stated at one point that he found
the use of profanity offensive to him, (T at 9) the
Court at no time discouraged the appellant from
discussing matters pertaining to his appearance with his
attorney in open court, nor did the Court provide any
warning to Mr. Borrego that if any further outbursts or
use of profanity continued, that he would be found in
contempt of court.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Mr. Borrego had a right to provice testimony or

information to the Court which concerned an appropriate
sentence.

Even though he had counsel appointed to speak

for him, he was not precluded from speaking himself and
in fact the Court gave him permission to speak during the
proceeding.

Even though Mr. Borrego did use profanity in

the courtroom, the use of profanity was not intended to
insult or degrade the Court, nor was it intended to
obstruct the judicial process.
II,

During the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Borrego

was expressly given permission by the Court to speak.

At

no time did the trial court warn Mr. Borrego that he was
out of line or that his language was such that it was
interfering with the orderly process of the proceeding.
The Court should c.v/e a warning to an individual that his
conduct is contumacious, unless the conduct is so far out
of line that the resort to criminal contempt is the only
way to restore order to the courtroom.
III.

Contemptuous acts under state law or those acts

which tend to interrupt the due course of a trial or
other judicial prodeeding.

No evidence is found in the

record that Mr. Borrego1s conduct was in disobedience to
the Court or in any way interrupted the judicial
proceeding.
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ARGUMENT
I.

MR. BORREGO^ COMMENTS TO THE COURT DURING
HIS SENTENCING HEARING ARE PROTECTED BY HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OP FREE SPEECH AND
TO APPEAL AND DEFEND IN PERSON AND BY
COUNSEL.

Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(4) (1953), provides that a
defendant in a criminal proceeding shall be allowed to
provide any testimony or information to the court which
concerns an appropriate sentence.

The Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution guarantees the person
accused of a crime, assistance of legal counsel at all
critical stages of the proceeding.

United States v.

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 192 (1967).
The Constitutional right to assistance of legal counsel
does not preclude a defendant from speaking to sentence
himself, nor does it prohibit him from communicating with
legal counsel during the proceeding.
12.

Const, of Ut. Sec.

Mr. Borrego did not have benefit of legal counsel

during his trial, and his court-appointed lawyer did not
have the benefit of reading a transcript of the actual
trial proceeding. (T at 2). It was therefore necessary
that Mr. Borrego be allowed to speak during the
sentencing process and make comments to his attorney.
Since Mr. Borrego was not allowed to stand next to his
attorney at the podium while addressing the Court, it
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became necessary that Mr. Borrego speak to his attorney
from across the room. Counsel for Mr. Borrego questioned
whether or not it was proper procedure for Mr. Borrego
to speak loudly in the courtroom as he was addressing
his attorney, and the Court indicated to counsel that it
was proper and that all of Mr. Borrego1s comments would
be made part of the record, since a microphone had been
placed in front of him, unless there was a valid reason
to the contrary. (T at 10 and 11).
Mr. Borrego1s rights to freedom of speech
guaranteed him by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 15 of the Constitution of
Utah, are susceptable to restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which a state may
lawfuly protect.

West Virginia State Board of Education

v. Varnette, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L.Ed. 1528, 63 S.Ct. 1178,
147 ALR 674 ( I ^ D .

The Utah State Legislature, in order

to preserve the dignity and order in our state
courtrooms, gave the power to our judges to punish
"disorderly, contemptuous or insolent" behavior toward
the judge while holding the Court, tending to interrupt
the due course of trial or the judicial proceding.
Code Ann., §78-32-1(1) (1953).

Utah

Thus, courts are obligated

to balance the defendant's rights to express himself freely
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in a criminal proceeding, and yet still maintain order
and dignity in the courtroom.

The United States Court

of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has established four elements
which are required in order to support a contempt
conviction.
(1) The conduct at issue must constitute
misbehavior, (2) the misbehavior must rise to
level of an obstruction of the administration of
justice, (3) conduct must be in courts presence or
so proximate that it obstructs the administration
of justice, and (4) there must be some sort of
intent to obstruct. United States v. Seale, 461
F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
Mr. Borregofs comments to the Court and to his
attorney during the sentencing proceeding were made with
the encouragement of the court and counsel, and were
certainly not intended to disrupt the orderly procedure
of the court.

The mere use of profanity in the courtroom

should not constitute contempt of court, unless such
profanity is used to insult or degrade the court, or is
used with the intent to obstruct the judicial process.
Gordon v. United States, 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir. 1979).
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that
Mr. Borrego intended to either insult the Court or to
obstruct the judicial process in his use of profanity,
and therefore his comments do not justify a finding
of contempt.
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ARGUMENT
II.

A JUDGE IS REQUIRED TO FOREWARN A PERSON
THAT HIS CONDUCT IS CONTUMACIOUS BEFORE
A FINDING OF CONTEMPT IS MADE.

A judge's power to punish contempt committed in his
presence should be exercised with patience and
self-restraintf and "judges must be cautious to avoid
over-reacting when persons not familiar with court
procedures, through ignorance or frustration,
unintentially cause minor commotions." Thrap v. People,
558 P.2d 576 (Colo., 1977).

Judge Medley, during the

sentencing process indicated that Mr. B, rrego had
appeared before him several times and that he assumed
that Mr. Borrego was familiar with the rules and conduct
which was expected of him in the courtroom, and that
during previous confrontations, the solution was to have
defendants removed from the courtroom until such time as
their ca:a is called before the Court. (T at 9).

Thus,

it is obvious from the record that Judge Medley was not
in the habit of citing individuals for contempt and, in
fact, had established a pattern for dealing with unruly
behavior in his courtroom.

In the case of In the Matter

of David Dellinger, et al. 370 F.Supp. 1304 (N.D. 111.
1973) , a Federal District Court ruled that a
defendant can not be cited for contempt for borderline
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conduct, unless he had been first warned that such
conduct will be regarded as contumacious, and that
differences in language patterns between different
social, ethnic and political groups are relevant to the
issue of intent in contempt prosecution.

The duty to

warn a defendant before contempt is found has also been
upheld by the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v.
Ellis, 540 P.2d 1082 (Colo., 1975) and by Mr. Justice
Powell in a concurring opinion in the case of Eaton v.
City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693
(1974) , when he said:
I place a high premium on the importance of
maintaining civility and good order in the
courtroom. But before there is resort to the
summary remedy of criminal contempt, the court
at least owes the party concerned some sort of
notice or writing.
The record is void of any warning by the Court to
Mr. Borrego that if he continued with his conduct, he
would be found in contempt of court.

The Court did

indicate that he found the use of profanity in his
courtroom offensive, but the statement that he found
profanity extremely offensive was made to Mr. Borrego1s
attorney and not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no
direction was given to counsel to warn Mr. Borrego.

In

his explanation that he found profanity offensive, Judge
Medley continued to explain to counsel that Mr. Borrego
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had acted in a similar manner on the day of trial and
that the remedy with such a defendant acting in that way
was to simply take him out of the courtroom until his
case was called. (T at 9).

The record also reflects that

at one pointf the Court, while making a statement to
counsel, asked Mr. Borrego not to interrupt himf and
there was no subsequent interruption by Mr. Borrego.
(T at 13) .
The finding of contempt was not warranted because no
warning was given and the trial judge acted
precipitously in finding Mr. Borrego in contempt, only
after he had pronounced sentence for the charges for
which Mr. Borrego was convicted at trial.

III.

ARGUMENT
THE RECORD OP" PROCEEDINGS IS VOID OF
ANY INTERRUPTION TO THE DUE COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT.

One of the elements of contempt by statute is that
there be an interruption of the due course of a trial or
other judicial proceeding. Utah Code Ann.
§78-32-1 (1) (1953) . Mr. Borrego was appearing before
Judge Medley on the 16th day of July, 1987f to be
sentenced on crimes which he was found guilty of at
trial.

The comments made by Mr. Borrego on the record

were made with the purpose of providing information
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to the Court which pertained to sentencing and motions
for new trial and for recusal of the Court, which were
being argued to the Court by counsel.

Although Judge

Medley, in his written findings, stated that the use of
profanity tended to disrupt the proceedings of the Court,
there is no specific reference to how the sentencing
proceeding was delayed or duly interrupted by Mr.
Borrego's comments.

In the case of Eaton v. City of

Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693
(1974) , the use of a street variety e/pletive, in answer
to a question on cross-examination was declared to
be insufficient to support a finding of contempt.

In

that case, the Court held:
In using the expletive in answering the
question on cross-examination, fit is not charged
that [petitioner] here disobeyed any valid court
order, talked loudly, acted boisterously, or
attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer
of the court from carrying on his court duties.f
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136, 85 S.Ct. 1375,
1377, 14 L.Ed.2d 290 (1965); see also In re Little,
404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972).
In the circumstances, the use of the expletive thus
cannot be used to 'constitute an imminent . . .
threat to the administration of justice.1
Before Judge Medley's finding of contempt can be
upheld on appeal, it must be shown by the record that Mr.
Borrego's conduct was in disobedience to any valid court
order, that it was loud, boisterous, or that Mr. Borrego
attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer of
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the Court from carrying on his court duties. His
comments were loud and on the record because the Court
said it was proper for him to speak to his attorney on
the record.
CONCLUSION
There is a very fine line between the Court's
interest in an orderly and dignified courtroom, and a
citizen's First Amendment right to free speech.
In balancing these two concerns, the Court must exercise
its power of contempt with patience and self-restraint,
being cautious to avoid over-reacting to behavior which,
although may be deemed offensive, does not seriously
affront or disrupt the judicial process.

This is

especially important in criminal proceedings, where a
person, such as Mr. Borrego, is already incarcerated and
•appears before the Court in handcuffs and shackles.
Unless circumstances exist where comments made by a
defendant are egregious as to justify a summary response
by the judge without specific warning, a judge should
issue a warning to the individual before finding
contempt.

The facts in this case certainly are not so

egregious.
Appellant seeks to have the finding of contempt
reversed for reasons that he did not intend to disrupt
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the sentencing process, and that his use of profanity in
the courtroom, although offensive to the Court, was not
disobedient, boisterous, or prevented any officer of the
court from carrying on his court duties,
DATED this

/ fc day of November, 1987.

Respectfully Submitted.
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RONALD E. KUNZ
COOK k WILDE, P.C.
Attorneyfs for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
November, 1987, a true and correct copy
instrument was mailed, postage pre-paid
Sanders, 175 East 400 South, #300, Salt
84111.

/ X day of
of the foregoing
to Gregory J.
Lake City, Utah

CIRCUIT COURT, STATS OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

WEST VJIIS CITY,

:

Plainc^ff,

:
FINDINGS AND CBDER OF CONTEMPT

vs.
:
:

FRANK RONALD 30RREG0,
DCS: 6/9/43
Defendant.

CASE NO. 871001094MS
871001095MS

FINDINGS
The Defendant in the above entitled rrattars appeared before this Court, for
sentencing on July 16, 1987. The Defendant was represented by counsel Mr. Ronald Kunc.
During the course of sentencing Defendant becane loud and boisterous, using
profanity which tended to interrupt the due course of the sentencing hearing. The
Defendant was requested by this Court to refrain frcti interrupting the Court while
the sentence was being pronounced, however, Defendant failed to honor this request
and responded with loud, boisterous profanity, demonstrating ccntaiiptuous or
insolent behavior toward this Court. The above described behavior continued
repeatedly curing the course of the sentencing hearing.
CRCER
Based uoon th° fi~s'y~rs^rQ2jnr*

Defendant * s conduct ** s dstpTrpiy^3^ to be

contemptuous and tended to interrupt the sentencing hearing, therefore, IT IS
HERE3Y ORDERED that the Defendant is found in Ccnrsnpt of this Court and committed
to the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty (30) days to run
consecutiveiv with all other canmifcnents cursuant to Utah Code Annotated

78-32-3 as amended.
DATED this 16th day of Julv, 1987,

<Jt>w^f -^Y/isML,
Fifth Circuit Court:
Co
Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify thar I mailed a true and correct copy of the
Finding and Crder of Content to Ronald E. Kunz, Attorney for the Defendant,
6925 Union Park, Suite 449, Midvale, Utah 84047.
DATED this loch dav of Julv, 1987.

THE JUDGMENT

77-18-1

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Confidential — Terms — Restitution
— Extension or revocation —
Hearings.

Section
77-18-2.

Expungement and sealing of
records.
77-18-5.5. Judgment of death — Defendant to
select firing squad or lethal injection.
77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitution
constitutes a lien.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Confidential
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revocation — Hearings.
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the department may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Department of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is
with the Department of Corrections.
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department
standards.
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or information from other
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of
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restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
and
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201 (3) and (4).
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The
order is considered a legal judgment under w h x h the victim may seek civil
remedy.
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor
cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated
by the court.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an additional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing.
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to service of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing
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78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.—The following
acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are contempts
of the authority of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial
or other judicial proceeding.
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty
by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected
to perform a judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by
a party to an action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and
acting as such without authority.
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of such court.
(3) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going
to, r*~ raining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on
the calendar for trial.
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court.
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn
or to answer as a witness.
(11) ^iVhen summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be
tried &t such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person
in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court.
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of
the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding
in an action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or
special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior
tribunal, magistrate, or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or
process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such
officer.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-32-1.
Compiler's Notes.
Except for the substitution of "court"
for "court of justice*' in the introductory
clause, this section is identical to former
section 104-45-1 (Code 1943) which "was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 53, § 3 .

Cross-References.
Bastardy proceedings, default in payments, 77-60-11.
Criminal Code not to affect contempt
power, 76-1-107, 76-3-201.
Discovery, sanctions for noncompliance
with order compelling discovery, Rules of
Civil Piocedure, Rule 37(b) (D)\
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